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Essay 
A FRESH LOOK AT TESTS FOR NONLITERAL 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Pamela Samuelson 
ABSTRACT—Determining whether a copyright has been infringed is often 
straightforward in cases involving verbatim copying or slavish imitation. 
But when there are no literal similarities between the works at issue, ruling 
on infringement claims becomes more difficult. The Second and Ninth 
Circuits have developed five similar yet distinct tests for judging nonliteral 
copyright infringement. This Essay argues that each of these tests is flawed 
and that courts have generally failed to provide clear guidance about which 
test to apply in which kinds of cases. 
This Essay offers seven specific strategies to improve the analysis of 
nonliteral infringements. Courts should do more, for instance, to tailor 
infringement analysis based on the nature of the works at issue (that is, are 
they fanciful or artistic works or are they factual or functional?). The goal 
of this Essay is to offer these strategies as a way to bring greater coherence 
and consistency to the determination of nonliteral infringements, and to do 
so in a manner that properly balances the interests of first and subsequent 
generations of creators. 
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opportunity to deliver the Julius Rosenthal Lectures, from which this Essay 
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Essay. I am also grateful for comments on an earlier draft by Julie Cohen, 
Paul Geller, Daniel Gervais, Paul Goldstein, Neil Netanel, David Nimmer, 
Christopher Sprigman, Rebecca Tushnet, and Molly Van Houweling. I 
apologize to the many colleagues whose work on nonliteral infringement I 
do not cite in this Essay; please understand that I am under severe word 
constraints that limit my engagement with the rich literature on this topic. 
These constraints also explain why I have concentrated on a rather small 
number of infringement cases. I hope this Essay will be of use to others 
who find the nonliteral copyright infringement case law to be frustratingly 
obscure, ambiguous, and confusing. 
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A central puzzle for U.S. copyright law in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries has been how to test for infringement of the exclusive right 
this law gives authors to control the reproduction of their works in copies. 
No subtlety of analysis is required when a work is copied word-for-word, 
line-for-line, or note-for-note or when second comers have made merely 
“colourable and fraudulent variations.”1 But as Professor Kaplan once 
observed, “[w]e are in a viscid quandary once we admit that ‘expression’ 
can consist of anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its 
sequential order.”2 
This Essay offers several strategies for refining infringement analysis 
so that it becomes less viscid in cases alleging what the Nimmer treatise 
describes as “nonliteral” similarities between two works.3 Nonliteral 
 
1 See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2310, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 205. While most 
nonliteral similarity cases involve claims of infringement of the reproduction right, it is also possible for 
nonliteral similarities to be the basis for claims of derivative work or public performance infringements. 
2 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 48 (1967). 
3 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-39 (2013) 
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
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infringement may arise, for instance, when a second comer appropriates 
detailed plot sequences from another author’s drama but uses different 
dialogue.4 
Part I discusses the five most frequently utilized tests for infringement 
of the reproduction right in nonliteral similarity cases.5 It compares these 
tests and explains why each test is flawed in one or more respects. Apart 
from these flaws, it is problematic that there are so many different tests and 
so little guidance about which test to use when. 
Part II recommends, among other things, that courts tailor 
infringement tests based on characteristics of the works at issue. The more 
artistic or fanciful a work is, for example, the more appropriate it is to 
focus infringement analysis primarily on similarities in the aesthetic appeal 
of the two works rather than on a dissective analysis of similarities and 
differences. The more factual or functional a work is, by contrast, the 
“thinner” is said to be its scope of copyright protection,6 suggesting that 
infringement analysis should place more emphasis on dissecting 
similarities and differences of these works and less on impressions. Courts 
should also give more guidance about what constitutes protectable 
expression in copyrighted works and what aspects, besides abstract ideas, 
are unprotectable by copyright. 
I. WHY CONVENTIONAL TESTS FOR JUDGING NONLITERAL 
INFRINGEMENT ARE PROBLEMATIC 
One reason why conventional tests for judging nonliteral copyright 
infringement are problematic is that there are too many tests and not 
enough guidance about which one to use in what kinds of cases. 
Occasionally, courts have applied several different tests without being sure 
which test is the right one.7 The Second and Ninth Circuits have been the 
most influential of the appellate courts in addressing nonliteral 
infringement claims. This section will critique the five tests these courts 
have utilized. Each test is similar, but none is the same. Each test has flaws, 
although each is flawed in a somewhat different way. 
 
4 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54–56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
5 The Supreme Court has twice endorsed a two-step test for infringement, first requiring proof of 
“ownership of a valid copyright,” and second, copying of constituent parts that are original. Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)). However, this test has not caught on in lower courts. 
6 See, e.g., id. at 349 (finding that factual works have a “thin” scope). 
7 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139–40, 146 (2d Cir. 
1998) (discussing multiple tests, none of which would have resulted in infringement, but deciding a 
quiz based on a TV program nonetheless infringed). 
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A. Arnstein v. Porter: The Copying and Improper-Appropriation Test 
One influential test for nonliteral infringement of the reproduction 
right derives from Arnstein v. Porter, decided by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals in 1946.8 
This case grew out of an unusual set of facts. Ira Arnstein accused the 
highly successful composer Cole Porter of infringing copyrights in several 
of his songs, including some that had never been published. Porter moved 
for summary judgment, claiming to have never heard Arnstein’s songs. The 
trial court granted Porter’s motion, characterizing as “fantastic” Arnstein’s 
claim that Porter had hired stooges to follow him and ransack his home in 
order to get access to Arnstein’s compositions.9 
Judge Frank wrote the Arnstein opinion for a split Second Circuit, with 
Judge Clark in dissent. The decision reversed the grant of summary 
judgment to Porter on the theory that Arnstein’s credibility as a witness 
was better left to a jury to decide.10 
Judge Frank distinguished two separate elements which were 
“essential” to a copyright plaintiff’s case: first, “that defendant copied from 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work,” and second, “that the copying (assuming it to 
be proved) went so far as to constitute improper appropriation.”11 
Concerning the first element, the Arnstein opinion recognized that 
defendants sometimes admit copying something from the plaintiff’s work. 
However, when defendants deny copying, plaintiffs have to rely on 
circumstantial evidence to prove this element, which requires consideration 
of whether the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and whether 
sufficient similarities existed between the two works from which the trier 
of fact could infer that the defendant had, in fact, copied from the plaintiff’s 
work.12 Deficiencies in evidence of access could be overcome, Judge Frank 
asserted, by evidence of similarities “so striking as to preclude the 
possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same 
result.”13 In the copying step of the test, expert testimony about similarities 
 
8 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated in part by First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 
391 U.S. 253 (1968). As of February 8, 2013, Arnstein had been positively cited in 142 federal court 
decisions on the subject of copyright in the WestlawNext database, at least once in every circuit except 
the Federal Circuit. But its influence is greater than the citation count alone reveals because the 
Goldstein treatise has adopted the Arnstein framework for its discussion of infringement. See 2 PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1 (3d ed. 2013). The Patry treatise describes Arnstein as a 
“landmark” case, although criticizing it in some respects. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§§ 9:118, 9:87 (2007). 
9 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467, 469. The lower court also took into account that Arnstein’s previous 
claims against other composers had been dismissed as vexatious. Id. at 474. 
10 Id. at 473–74. Judge Learned Hand was the third member of the Arnstein panel. Id. at 468. 
11 Id. at 468. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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and differences in the works is admissible, and the trier of fact is allowed 
more generally to engage in dissective analysis of the works at issue.14 
Arnstein offered scant guidance about the improper-appropriation step 
of the test, except to say that expert testimony and dissective analysis are 
“irrelevant” to this determination and that the final judgment should be 
made based on a lay listener’s impression about the impropriety of the 
appropriation.15 As the Arnstein test has been understood over time, the 
second-step inquiry is whether there is substantial similarity in expression 
in the two works and whether, as perceived by the audience for a work of 
that kind, the defendant improperly copied that expression from the 
plaintiff’s work.16 
There are at least three flaws in the Arnstein two-step test for 
nonliteral infringement. First, the test is deeply confusing because it directs 
the trier of fact to make two different determinations about similarities and 
copying, each of which is based on a different meaning of the key terms. 
The presence of the same erroneous entries in both a plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s maps, for example, might prove first-step copying, even if 
these errors, standing alone, would be insufficient to prove improper 
appropriation (which Arnstein also designates as a form of copying17). 
Arnstein recognizes that similarity evidence might sometimes be “double-
purpose,” that is, it may “justify an inference of copying and . . . prove 
improper appropriation.”18 But the court emphasized that copying and 
improper appropriation are distinct elements, and “proof of improper 
appropriation need not consist of similarities which, standing alone, would 
support an inference of copying.”19 The court did not explain what it meant 
by this statement, which seems somewhat confusing. 
Courts and commentators have sought to mitigate this confusion by 
designating the copying analysis in Arnstein’s first step as “copying in 
fact”20 and the similarity analysis in the first step as “probative similarity.”21 
They have also emphasized that the similarity assessment in the second 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 468, 473. One empirical study shows that lay listeners find it hard to distinguish between 
compositional similarities (which are relevant to infringement) and performance similarities (which are 
not relevant to infringement, but to which lay listeners tend to give considerable weight in assessing 
similarities). See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music 
Composition Copyright Infringement 39, 41 (Apr. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030509. 
16 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 9.1, 9.3.1. 
17 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
18 Id. at 469. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 291 (3d ed. 
2010). 
21 See, e.g., Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some 
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204 (1990). 
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step must focus on the expressive elements of the plaintiff’s work and 
improper appropriation may only be found if the defendant copied 
substantial amounts of expression from the plaintiff’s work.22 While these 
measures help to some degree, it is far from clear that judges or juries will 
be able to keep separate the two distinct notions of similarity and copying 
that Arnstein envisions. 
Second, Arnstein’s formulation of a two-step test may put defendants 
at an unfair disadvantage. The disadvantage can arise because the test 
directs the trier of fact to decide, first, that there are enough similarities 
between the works at issue to support an inference that the defendant 
copied something from the plaintiff’s work and then to decide whether that 
copying amounted to improper appropriation. This may stack the deck in 
the plaintiff’s favor because the trier of fact will have already made a full 
commitment to finding that there was copying before deciding if too much 
was appropriated. 
This seems particularly unfair because first-step copying evidence may 
consist of nonexpressive elements (e.g., erroneous entries in a compilation), 
which should be irrelevant to the second-step copying inquiry, which is 
supposed to be based entirely on copying of expressive elements. It also 
seems unfair because Arnstein directs that the improper-appropriation 
conclusion should be based on the lay observers’ or listeners’ impressions, 
rather than on careful consideration of similarities and differences between 
expressive and nonexpressive aspects of the works. The risk is that the trier 
of fact may conclude that second-step copying has occurred as a spillover 
from a finding of first-step copying. Indeed, Arnstein seems to anticipate 
this spillover given its articulation of the second-step inquiry as whether 
“the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute 
improper appropriation.”23 This formulation is difficult to square with the 
court’s insistence that copying and improper appropriation are distinct 
elements in copyright infringement cases that should not be confused.24 
Third, the Arnstein test is unsuited to serve as a general test for 
infringement because it was designed to deal with claims that similarities 
were due to independent creation.25 In a great many and perhaps most 
cases, defendants admit to copying something from the work they are 
alleged to have infringed, but contend that the copied elements are ideas or 
otherwise beyond the scope of protection that copyright offers to the 
 
22 See, e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.2.1; 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, 
§ 13.03[A]. 
23 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
24 Id. Some evidence may, of course, serve a dual purpose. Close paraphrasing might, for instance, 
be evidence both of copying-in-fact and of improper appropriation. The problem with the Arnstein 
formulation is that it risks intermixing the two concepts. 
25 Independent creation of substantially similar works does not infringe because liability depends 
on reproduction of the plaintiff’s work. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 13.01[B]; 
3 PATRY, supra note 8, §§ 9:17, 9:36. 
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plaintiff’s work.26 Applied literally, the Arnstein test becomes illogical in 
cases involving defendants who admit to copying something from the 
plaintiff’s work because it would mean that no dissective analysis could be 
undertaken nor expert testimony used.27 The trier of fact would be directed 
to go straight to the lay observer/listener overall-impression test. 
Given the free expression interests at stake in copyright cases 
involving nonliteral infringement and the Supreme Court’s insistence that 
the idea–expression distinction is essential to the consistency of copyright 
and the First Amendment,28 a strict application of Arnstein in 
nonindependent creation cases is difficult to justify. Some dissective 
analysis should be undertaken in every copyright infringement case, and 
expert testimony may be needed to aid the trier of fact, whether a judge or 
jury, in understanding the intended audience for the works, what elements 
are common in works of that kind, or other issues. 
It is unlikely that Judge Frank expected his words in Arnstein would 
carry so much weight in infringement analysis in subsequent cases. After 
all, the actual holding of the Arnstein opinion was aimed at giving 
copyright plaintiffs their day in court by taking away the summary 
judgment option from defendants faced with claims bordering on the 
delusional.29 Interestingly enough, it has become much easier over the years 
for defendants to win noninfringement rulings on summary judgment.30 It 
thus seems that the holding of Arnstein has, in effect, been overruled while 
its dictum lives on. Go figure. 
B. Krofft v. McDonald’s: The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. 
is the Ninth Circuit’s most widely cited case establishing a two-step test for 
judging nonliteral copyright infringement.31 Krofft, the creator of the H.R. 
Pufnstuf television program, sued McDonald’s for infringement, alleging 
that McDonaldland commercials had copied expressive elements of the 
 
26 See, e.g., A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977–78 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(considering a claim that a movie nonliterally infringed the copyright of a history book). The Krofft, 
Roth, Nichols, Whelan, and Altai decisions discussed later in this Essay are all dependent creation cases. 
27 The Nimmer treatise is critical of Arnstein on this ground. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 
note 3, § 13.03[E][3][a][i]. 
28 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003). 
29 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469. 
30 See, e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 9.2, n.2. 
31 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded on other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-553, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006)), as recognized in Dream 
Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2009). As of February 8, 2013, Krofft 
had been positively cited in 309 federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the WestlawNext 
database, at least once in every circuit. Forty-six percent of those cites are from jurisdictions outside of 
the Ninth Circuit, which is indicative of the decision’s influence. 
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Pufnstuf programs.32 A jury ruled in Krofft’s favor; McDonald’s appealed; 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.33 
The main defense in Krofft was that the McDonaldland characters and 
settings were too different from the Pufnstuf characters and settings to 
infringe. The defendants argued their case “by dissecting the constituent 
parts of the Pufnstuf series—characters, setting, and plot—and pointing out 
the dissimilarities between these parts and those of the McDonaldland 
commercials.”34 They analyzed “the clothing, colors, features, and 
mannerisms of each character.”35 Pufnstuf wore a cummerbund, for 
instance, whereas the McDonaldland mayor wore a diplomat’s sash. 
Several of the most damning facts in Krofft demonstrated the 
dependence of the McDonaldland commercials on H.R. Pufnstuf characters 
and settings. In early 1970 the Needham advertising agency approached 
Krofft to express interest in negotiating a deal to base a commercial 
campaign for McDonald’s on Pufnstuf characters. After numerous 
telephone exchanges about this possibility and one in-person visit, 
Needham informed Krofft that “it was going forward with the idea of a 
McDonaldland advertising campaign based on the H.R. Pufnstuf series,” 
acknowledging “the need to pay the Kroffts a fee for preparing artistic 
designs and engineering plans.”36 However, shortly thereafter Needham 
abruptly informed Krofft “that the advertising campaign had been 
cancelled” when, in fact, it was proceeding ahead without a license.37 
Needham not only hired former Krofft employees to design the costumes 
and sets for the McDonaldland commercials, but “also hired the same voice 
expert” that Krofft had for the Pufnstuf character voices.38 
The jury was almost certainly swayed by this evidence, as well as by 
evidence that the Kroffts were unable to obtain new licenses for their 
Pufnstuf characters or extend existing licenses because of the competition 
with McDonaldland merchandise.39 
 
32 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1161–62. 
33 Id. at 1162, 1175. 
34 Id. at 1165. 
35 Id. at 1166–67. 
36 Id. at 1161 & n.2. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. It did not help McDonald’s case with the jury or the appellate court that Needham deceived 
Krofft in some respects about its arrangement with McDonald’s. Id. at 1161 n.2. 
39 Id. at 1162. The Ice Capades cancelled its license for Pufnstuf characters and instead licensed 
McDonaldland characters. Id. The jury may also have been swayed by the fact that Krofft was a family 
firm that had been in the entertainment industry for forty years. Id. at 1161 n.1. Its biggest hit, H.R. 
Pufnstuf, had only been showing on NBC for a few months before Needham contacted the Kroffts 
about a possible deal. Id. at 1161. The jury may have perceived that a large corporation and well-heeled 
advertising agency were taking unfair advantage of a smaller creative firm. There was, in other words, 
an unfair competition undercurrent in Krofft. 
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The court in Krofft announced its own two-step nonliteral 
infringement test, consciously adapted from Arnstein. The court called the 
first step “extrinsic” because “it depends not on the responses of the trier of 
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed,” including 
“the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and 
the setting for the subject.”40 In this step, dissective analysis and expert 
testimony are permissible, as in Arnstein. The court characterized the 
second step as “intrinsic” because “it does not depend on the type of 
external criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic test.”41 During the 
second step the trier of fact is supposed to engage in a more impressionistic 
judgment of infringement without the aid of dissection or expert testimony, 
also as in Arnstein. 
The Krofft test is an improvement over the Arnstein test in two 
important ways: first, its entire focus is on sorting out whether similarities 
between the works exist as to elements that copyright does or does not 
protect, and second, it implicitly recognizes that independent creation is a 
separate issue. Hence, Krofft does not make the mistake of asking the trier 
of fact to determine copying-in-fact based in part on nonexpressive 
similarities between the works at issue before asking whether too much was 
taken, so it does not put defendants at the same disadvantage that Arnstein 
does. And by not trying to induce the trier to keep track of two different 
types of similarities and of copying, it is somewhat less confusing than 
Arnstein. 
However, Krofft is worse in some ways than Arnstein. First, the 
“extrinsic” and “intrinsic” terminology of the Krofft test is inapt and 
confusing. As an adjective, “extrinsic” means that the thing so described is 
inessential, not an inherent characteristic of the thing’s true nature, or has 
come from the outside; foreign, extraneous, and alien are its synonyms.42 
Characteristics such as colors, shapes, and sizes, which Krofft’s first step 
considers, are, however, inherent characteristics, not outside or foreign 
elements. So “extrinsic” is an inapt word to use as the name of that first 
step. “Intrinsic” is no more helpful, although perhaps less misleading, as a 
descriptor of the second step. Later cases have suggested that the two steps 
might be “more sensibly described as objective and subjective analyses of 
expression.”43 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit has nonetheless persisted in 
the extrinsic/intrinsic terminology.44 
Second, as originally formulated in Krofft, the extrinsic step was 
focused on whether there was “substantial similarity in ideas” between the 
 
40 Id. at 1164. 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Extrinsic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/extrinsic (last visited July 25, 2013). 
43 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). 
44 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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two works at issue.45 Substantial similarity in ideas should, however, never 
be the basis for making an infringement determination. Copyright law does 
not protect ideas, no matter how similar they are. Fortunately, this error 
was corrected over time,46 and creating a work that has the same or similar 
ideas to a pre-existing work is no longer suspicious in the Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit seems to have made this mistake in Krofft because it 
misunderstood the Arnstein first step. The court seemed to think that when 
the Second Circuit “refers to ‘copying’ which is not itself an infringement, 
it must be suggesting copying merely of the work’s idea.”47 The court in 
Krofft was trying to reconcile its first step with the Arnstein first step, but 
the first steps in the two tests are really quite different. The Arnstein first 
step was focused on whether there were enough similarities between two 
works to defeat an independent creation claim. The Krofft first step, by 
contrast, is focused on a dissective analysis of similarities and differences 
in expression in the works at issue. 
Third, as the intrinsic step has been applied over time, the core inquiry 
has become whether the defendant “captured the total ‘concept and feel’” 
of the plaintiff’s work.48 After viewing representative examples of the 
plaintiff’s Pufnstuf show and the challenged McDonald’s commercials that 
featured Pufnstuf-like characters, the court concurred with the jury’s 
judgment that the defendant had “captured the ‘total concept and feel’ of 
the Pufnstuf show” and affirmed the jury’s finding of infringement.49 The 
next subsection explains why courts should not use a total concept and feel 
test in copyright cases. 
C. Roth Greeting Cards: The Total Concept and Feel Test 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co. was the first case to articulate 
a total concept and feel (which this Essay will condense to “total concept”) 
approach to judging nonliteral infringement of the reproduction right.50 
 
45 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
46 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357–58. 
47 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165. 
48 Shaw v. Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356). 
49 Krofft, 562 F.2d. at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 
(9th Cir. 1970)). As of February 8, 2013, 106 federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the 
WestlawNext database have positively cited Krofft with a reference to the total concept and feel test, 64 
from within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. 
50 429 F.2d at 1110, superseded on other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 
ch. 5, § 411(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2583 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006)), as recognized in Cosmetic 
Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010). As of February 8, 2013, Roth 
had been positively cited in 88 federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the WestlawNext 
database, at least once in all circuits except the Federal Circuit. The total concept test came to be 
associated more with Krofft than with Roth over time. The total concept test has been mentioned in 33 
cases that cite Roth and in 106 cases citing Krofft. The total concept phrase was rarely used prior to 
1980 (only 3 cases). Krofft may be responsible for an uptick in use of the phrase because 48 subsequent 
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After the Ninth Circuit embraced the total concept approach in Krofft, this 
test has become widely applied, sometimes as a one-step test and 
sometimes as part of the Krofft test. 
In Roth, a split Ninth Circuit panel reversed a lower court dismissal of 
infringement claims. Roth’s facts help to explain why. United had made a 
practice of acquiring Roth cards at gift shows and retail outlets to observe 
“what the competition was doing.”51 It then designed cards that were 
similar to Roth’s and sold them under its own label.52 Roth’s cards featured 
a cartoon-like drawing and a sentimental expression on the front of or on 
the inside of the card, or both. One card, for instance, featured on the front 
a forlorn boy, weeping, with the message “I miss you already” and the 
inscription “and You Haven’t even Left” on the inside.53 United used the 
same message on one of its cards, but a different drawing of a sad man. 
Seven greeting cards were challenged as infringements. Because of 
graphical differences in the cards, the trial court entered judgment for 
United, and Roth appealed.54 
The appellate court agreed with United that the textual material in 
Roth’s cards, “considered apart from its arrangement on the cards and its 
association with artistic representations, was not original” enough to be 
copyrightable.55 However, the court also stated that “all elements of each 
card, including text, arrangement of text, art work, and association between 
art work and text, [must] be considered as a whole.”56 Considering all 
elements together, the court concluded that the Roth cards were “both 
original and copyrightable.”57 With regard to infringement, while 
conceding that United’s art work was “somewhat different” than Roth’s, 
the court opined that “[t]he test of infringement is whether the work is 
recognizable by an ordinary observer as having been taken from the 
copyrighted source.”58 It characterized the similarities between the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s cards as “remarkable” in the “characters 
depicted in the art work, the mood they portrayed, the combination of art 
work conveying a particular mood with a particular message, and the 
arrangement of the words on the greeting card.”59 This caused the court to 
 
cases used it between 1980 and 1989. But more than half of the copyright citations to this phrase come 
from cases decided after 2000 (136 cases out of 259 total). 
51 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 Id. at 1110–11. 
53 Id. at 1110 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Id. at 1107, 1110. 
55 Id. at 1109. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1110 (quoting Bradbury v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1961)) 
(internal quotations marks omitted). 
59 Id. The lettering was also similar. Id. 
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conclude that “in total concept and feel the cards of United are the same as 
the copyrighted cards of Roth.”60 
There are several troubling things about using the total concept 
approach to judge nonliteral copyright infringement. For one thing, it does 
not focus the trier of fact’s attention on specific expressive elements of the 
plaintiff’s work or on whether the defendant copied those expressive 
elements from the plaintiff’s work. This is, however, what the infringement 
determination is supposed to measure. 
Second, this approach makes it too easy for unprotectable elements to 
be swept into the infringement analysis because it is so vague and because 
it uncritically embraces a fuzzy totality approach. Indeed, it practically 
directs the trier of fact to consider conceptual similarities as a basis for 
infringement, even though concepts have never been protectable by U.S. 
copyright law.61 Indeed, § 102(b) of U.S. copyright law states that “[i]n no 
case does copyright protection . . . extend to any . . . concept.”62 Strangely 
enough, no court applying the total concept test has noticed that this 
formulation might run afoul of the strictures of § 102(b). 
Third, the total concept approach contributes to the unpredictability of 
infringement determinations. Its vagueness makes it hard for courts to 
review and overturn unwarranted infringement rulings. Unless the 
application of this test is strictly limited—for example, to artistic and 
fanciful works—the total concept test is “problematic.”63 
Fourth and relatedly, this approach is difficult to square with the First 
Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has opined that copyright is 
consistent with the First Amendment because this law distinguishes 
between expression (which copyright protects) and ideas (which are 
beyond copyright’s reach),64 a vague standard such as “total concept and 
feel” does not provide guidance as to whether too much expression has 
been taken from the plaintiff’s work.65 
 
60 Id. 
61 Although the unprotectability of concepts was not codified until after Roth, copyright 
commentary and case law had long recognized the unprotectability of ideas and concepts. See, e.g., 
EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 98 (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1879); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes 
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1924–28 (2007). 
62 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). After enactment of this provision, one might have expected courts to 
be more skeptical of the total concept approach to infringement, but this has not occurred. 
63 See, e.g., 3 PATRY, supra note 8, § 9:72. 
64 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003). 
65 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 410–20 (1989); see also Joseph 
P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 432–35 (2007) (noting that the 
Supreme Court in Eldred did not consider uncertainty in the idea–expression distinction in its First 
Amendment analysis). 
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Fifth, Roth is unconvincing on the merits. Judge Kilkenny, in dissent, 
made a strong case against the majority’s holding. He agreed with his 
colleagues that the words on the cards were unprotectable by copyright law 
and that the art work on the cards, while imitated, was not infringed. 
However, it was illogical, in his view, to hold that “the uncopyrightable 
words and the imitated, but not copied art work, constitutes such total 
composition as to be subject to protection under the copyright laws.”66 Such 
a conclusion “results in the whole becoming substantially greater than the 
sum total of its parts.”67 There was, in other words, too little original 
expression and substance in Roth’s cards to justify a total concept 
approach.68 
The Roth majority was probably influenced by a sense that United had 
engaged in unfair competition by not doing enough independent creative 
work. It noted, for instance, that Roth had hired writers and artists to 
develop its cards, whereas United employed no writers or artists.69 The one 
employee whose designs were on United’s cards was quite hazy in his 
testimony about the origins of United’s cards and about his acquaintance 
with Roth’s cards, which the majority found troubling.70 This employee 
seemed to go to shows to see what United’s competitors (not just Roth) 
were turning out and then imitate them.71 This unfairness may have tipped 
the scale toward infringement despite numerous visual differences in the 
cards. 
While the Roth majority certainly used the total concept phrase, it did 
not announce this as a test that should be widely used in infringement 
cases. The phrase was more an off-hand comment than a well-conceived 
way to think about nonliteral infringement. Indeed, the test the majority 
purported to apply was “whether the work is recognizable by an ordinary 
observer as having been taken from the copyrighted source.”72 It is hence 
somewhat bizarre that the total concept test has become so widely used in 
copyright cases.73 
 
66 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1970) (Kilkenny, J., 
dissenting). 
67 Id. There may be times, such as in Krofft, when the expressive whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts. Roth was not such a case. 
68 Judge Kilkenny distinguished Roth from Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 
F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940), on which the majority had principally relied. Id. Detective Comics involved a 
close imitation of more expressive pictorial representations, verbal descriptions, and dialogue taken 
from Superman comics. Id. 
69 Id. at 1107–08 (majority opinion). 
70 Id. at 1108. 
71 Id. at 1110–11. 
72 Id. at 1110 (emphasis added) (quoting Bradbury v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 
485 (9th Cir. 1961)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo 
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908)). 
73 See infra notes 77–88 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the Roth opinion was careless in citing to and misquoting the 
Supreme Court’s decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo 
Co.74 Apollo was a strange case to cite in Roth because it concerned a very 
different type of infringement issue (i.e., whether piano rolls were 
infringing copies of musical compositions).75 The only statement in Apollo 
that comes close to the Roth pincite concerned what the term “copy” 
means, which was “that which comes so near to the original as to give to 
every person seeing it the idea created by the original.”76 Apollo was 
concerned with the materiality of a copy as perceived by the human eye; a 
viewer could not read the musical composition alleged to infringe in Apollo 
by looking at a piano roll. 
Given the many flaws of this test, it is quite surprising that the total 
concept approach has become an integral part of the Ninth Circuit’s 
nonliteral infringement test and has been endorsed in numerous circuits in a 
wide variety of cases such as those involving similarities in fabric 
designs,77 masquerade costumes,78 slippers,79 duffel bags,80 rugs,81 jewelry,82 
dolls,83 children’s books,84 scripts for a television program,85 commercials,86 
videogames,87 and building designs.88 Although some early cases applied 
 
74 209 U.S. 1, superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, ch. 1, § 101, 90 
Stat. 2541, 2542 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)), as recognized in Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. 
Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). For Roth’s citation to Apollo, see supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
75 Id. at 8–9. 
76 Id. at 17 (quoting West v. Francis, (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 737, 743, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361 (K.B.) 
1363) (internal quotation mark omitted). Apollo is surely wrong in suggesting that infringement can be 
based on two works that conjure up the same ideas. The quote in Roth actually comes from a different 
case. See Bradbury, 287 F.2d at 485 (holding that a CBS program infringed Bradbury’s book 
copyright). 
77 See, e.g., Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1999). 
78 See, e.g., Nat’l Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (S.D. Cal. 
1988). 
79 See, e.g., Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 175, 188 (D. Minn. 1985), aff’d 
mem., 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986). 
80 See, e.g., Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 510–11 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
81 See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136–37 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
82 See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2001). 
83 See, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 
84 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2002). 
85 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990). 
86 See, e.g., Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
87 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 228, 230 (D. Md. 1981). 
88 See, e.g., Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Shine’s use of a total 
concept test has been criticized. See Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: 
Filtering Out “Total Concept and Feel,” 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1878–82 (2007) (arguing that an 
“abstraction, filtration, comparison” test should be used in architectural work cases). 
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this test in cases involving computer programs,89 this approach fell out of 
favor in later software copyright decisions.90 Only rarely have courts 
declined to apply a total concept approach.91 
Courts and juries do not inevitably reach incorrect conclusions when 
applying a total concept test.92 However, when courts have gotten to the 
right result in these cases, it has been despite this vague formulation, not 
because of it. Far better would be a test that focused the trier of fact’s 
attention on whether there is substantial similarity in the aesthetic 
combination of expressive elements in the two works at issue that the 
defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work. 
D. Nichols v. Universal Pictures: Judge Hand’s Abstractions Test 
Judge Learned Hand’s 1930 decision in Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp. has emerged in recent decades as another influential nonliteral 
infringement decision.93 Its approach to infringement analysis is quite 
similar to Arnstein’s in some respects, although different in others. While it 
is not as flawed as Arnstein, it introduced some concepts into copyright 
infringement discourse that had some distortionary effects in certain 
computer program cases decades later.94 
At issue in Nichols was whether Universal had infringed Ms. 
Nichols’s copyright in her play, Abie’s Irish Rose, by making a motion 
picture, The Cohens and The Kellys, having a similar plot.95 The play 
featured a prosperous Jewish father who wanted his son to marry a Jewish 
woman instead of the Gentile woman to whom the son had been attracted 
in the past, as well as an Irish Catholic father who wanted his daughter to 
marry a Catholic. After some subterfuge with the fathers, the couple invited 
them to a marriage ceremony, with each father assuming that his religious 
 
89 See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 
1986).  
90 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting 
Apple’s argument that the district court should have considered the “‘total concept and feel’ of the 
works”). 
91 See, e.g., Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 
1985) (not applying total concept and feel approach to radiator parts catalogs), overruled in part by 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994). 
92 See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding defendants’ 
book and movie not substantially similar to plaintiff’s screen treatment); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall 
Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding snowman plush toys substantially different in 
their total concept and feel). 
93 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). As of February 8, 2013, Nichols had been positively cited 204 times 
in federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the WestlawNext database and cited in every 
circuit. Almost half (99) of these citations are from cases decided after 1989, 60 since 1998. 
94 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 211–12, 217–23 (D. Mass. 
1992), rev’d, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 102–03 and 
accompanying text. 
95 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120–21. 
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preferences had been respected. Disappointment led to disaffection until a 
child was born that brought the families back together. The movie had a 
similar plot, although with some inversions (e.g., the daughter being Jewish 
and the son being Catholic) and some differences (e.g., an inheritance plot 
missing from the play). Nichols relied upon expert testimony regarding the 
similarities between her play and the movie.96 The District Court was not 
convinced by Nichols’s evidence and dismissed the action; Nichols 
appealed.97 
Nichols, like Arnstein, seems to endorse a two-step process in which a 
first step involves dissective analysis and a second step involves the 
“ingenuous” impression of a spectator.98 Nichols, like Arnstein, also 
expresses some disdain toward expert testimony.99 
An important difference between Nichols and Arnstein, however, is 
the former’s approach to dissective analysis: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is 
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of 
what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a 
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended.100 
Reviewing the similarities and differences in incident, character, and 
overall plot, Judge Hand concluded that “the defendant took no more—
assuming that it took anything at all—than the law allowed.”101 While not 
saying so directly, Judge Hand must have concluded that such similarities 
as existed were too high up in the abstractions hierarchy to be protectable 
expression. 
The patterns-of-abstraction concept from the Nichols opinion has been 
quite influential in subsequent cases. It is helpful in focusing on the level at 
which similarities exist when making infringement determinations. One 
problem with the Nichols approach, however, has been that it seems to 
suggest that only relatively high-level abstractions are beyond the scope of 
copyright protection. Judge Hand failed to acknowledge that some very 
detailed and concrete elements of protected works are sometimes 
unprotectable as well. 
 
96 Id. at 122–23. 
97 Id. at 119. 
98 The first part of the opinion compares the plot and characters of the play. Id. at 120–21. Then 
toward the end of the opinion, Judge Hand speaks of the “firmer, if more naïve, ground of [the 
observers’] impressions.” Id. at 123. 
99 Judge Hand thought that expert testimony had prolonged the trial and confused the issues. Id. 
100 Id. at 121. As of February 8, 2013, 73 federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the 
WestlawNext database have quoted this passage. 
101 Id. 
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Consider, for instance, the command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3. 
Borland International developed a spreadsheet program with an emulation 
interface presenting the same commands in the same order as the Lotus 
software in order to allow users who had constructed Lotus macros (mini-
programs that allowed one stroke execution of common sequences of 
functions) to reuse them when they switched to Borland’s competitive 
spreadsheet program. The District Court drew upon the Hand abstractions 
test to support its conclusion that the command hierarchy was part of the 
protectable expression of the Lotus program because it was a detailed, 
concrete, and original part of the Lotus program, and hence not an abstract 
idea.102 The First Circuit reversed because it regarded the command 
hierarchy as an unprotectable method of operating a spreadsheet program 
under § 102(b), rather like the buttons and dials on VCR machines.103 
Judge Hand’s abstractions test is premised on the proposition that it is 
“essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right cannot be 
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial 
variations.”104 It is unfortunate, though, that Judge Hand seems almost to 
revel in the unpredictability of copyright. He says, for example, that 
“decisions cannot help much in a new case” and that “[n]obody has ever 
been able to fix that boundary [between ideas and expressions], and nobody 
ever can.”105 In another of his well-known copyright opinions, he says that 
decisions must “inevitably be ad hoc.”106 However much one might admire 
Judge Hand’s facility with words, his glorification of copyright’s 
unpredictability may have contributed to uncertainty about copyright 
boundaries for follow-on creators wanting to express themselves by 
drawing upon the cultural landscape in which they live.107 
E. Computer Associates v. Altai: 
 The Abstraction, Filtration, and Comparison Test 
The most widely used test for judging nonliteral infringement of 
computer programs was announced by the Second Circuit in Computer 
 
102 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 211–12, 217–23 (D. Mass. 1992), 
rev’d, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
103 Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 815–17. 
104 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
105 Id. 
106 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). As of 
February 8, 2013, this case had been positively cited in 326 federal court decisions on the subject of 
copyright in the WestlawNext database, in 54 of which the “inevitably be ad hoc” phrase appears. 
107 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public 
Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 157–65 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz 
eds., 2006) (discussing authorial interests in drawing upon the cultural landscape). There are similar 
First Amendment problems with the unpredictability of copyright’s boundaries as with the total concept 
test discussed supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
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Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.108 This test, known as the 
“abstraction, filtration, and comparison” (which this Essay will condense to 
“filtration”) test, has three steps. 
The first step involves constructing a hierarchy of abstractions for the 
plaintiff’s program.109 The second step filters out various types of 
unprotectable elements of the program. This includes not only high-level 
abstractions embodied in the program, but also efficient design elements, 
standard programming techniques, and structural aspects that are dictated 
by external factors, such as the computer hardware or software with which 
the program at issue is intended to interoperate.110 The third step compares 
the expressive elements of the plaintiff’s program that remain after the 
filtration step with the elements of the defendant’s program alleged to 
infringe.111 Finding infringement is warranted if there is substantial 
similarity in program expressions and these similarities resulted from 
copying. 
Each step of the Altai filtration test involves dissective analysis, and 
expert testimony is seemingly admissible in all three steps.112 The Arnstein 
approach to nonliteral infringement was sound, Altai concluded, “when the 
material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily comprehensible 
and generally familiar to the average lay person.”113 But the “highly 
complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of [nonliteral 
software] claims” called for a different approach because the internal 
designs of computer programs were “likely to be somewhat impenetrable 
by lay observers.”114 
The main issue in Altai was whether the parameter lists and macros of 
Computer Associate’s (CA) scheduling program were part of the 
protectable “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) that Altai had 
copied from CA.115 Altai accepted responsibility for infringement as to code 
that a former CA employee had directly copied from CA’s program into 
 
108 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992). As of February 8, 2013, Altai had been positively cited in 
236 federal court decisions on the subject of copyright in the WestlawNext database and has been cited 
in every circuit except the D.C. Circuit. More than half of those citations are from jurisdictions outside 
the Second Circuit. 
109 Id. at 706–07. The lowest level of this hierarchy would be the source or object code, and the 
highest level would be the ultimate function of the program. The court in Altai drew this abstractions 
analysis from Judge Hand’s Nichols decision and said it was adaptable to computer programs. Id. 
110 Id. at 707–10. 
111 Id. at 710. 
112 The Second Circuit left to the trial court’s discretion whether to admit expert testimony. Id. at 
713. The district court in Altai had appointed a computer scientist expert to testify about the programs’ 
similarities and differences. Id. at 712–13. 
113 Id. at 713. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 706, 714–15 (quoting Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 
1224 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Altai’s software, but argued that its reimplementation of parameter lists and 
macros had resulted in noninfringing code.116 The district court agreed, 
finding that the parameter lists and macros were dictated by external 
factors, that is, by the constraints imposed by the interfaces of the three 
IBM operating system programs with which CA and Altai’s scheduling 
programs were designed to interoperate.117 Applying the filtration test, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling of noninfringement.118 
The Altai filtration test was developed in reaction to another software-
specific test developed by the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. 
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.119 The Whelan decision had interpreted 
copyright law as extending protection to program SSO as long as there was 
more than one way to structure a program to achieve certain functions and 
to program “look and feel,” by which it seemed to mean the manner in 
which programs carried out their functions.120 The Whelan test for 
infringement was this: 
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and 
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of 
the expression of the idea. . . . Where there are various means of achieving the 
desired purpose, then the particular means chosen . . . is expression, not 
idea.121 
Altai noted the mixed reception Whelan had received in the case law 
and the heavy criticism levied against it in the academic literature.122 While 
agreeing with Whelan that program structure could sometimes be protected 
expression, the court in Altai thought that Whelan displayed a “flawed 
understanding” of program methods of operation and failed to recognize 
that the “essentially utilitarian nature” of computer programs limited the 
extent of copyright protection available to them.123 
As important as was Altai’s recognition that copyright protection does 
not extend to efficient program designs, standard programming techniques, 
or elements of programs dictated by external factors, Altai did not call for 
exclusion of program “procedure, process, system, [or] method of 
operation,” even though the copyright statute explicitly states that “[i]n no 
case does copyright protection . . . extend” to such elements.124 The court 
did acknowledge that programs were process-oriented works and that 
 
116 Id. at 699–701. 
117 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 550, 561–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693. 
118 Altai, 982 F.2d at 714–15. 
119 797 F.2d 1222. 
120 Id. at 1246. 
121 Id. at 1236 (emphasis omitted). 
122 Altai, 982 F.2d at 705. 
123 Id. at 704, 706. 
124 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
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program processes, like the bookkeeping processes at issue in the 
“seminal” Baker v. Selden decision,125 were ineligible for copyright 
protection.126 And yet, the filtration step of its test did not direct the 
exclusion of these elements, as it should have. Some subsequent decisions 
have rectified this omission.127 
II. SEVEN WAYS TO IMPROVE NONLITERAL INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
This Part will discuss seven ways to improve infringement analysis in 
nonliteral similarity cases. First, triers of fact should do some analytic 
dissection and make some overall-impression judgment in virtually every 
nonliteral similarity case, and the impression judgment should be made 
keeping in mind the existence of unprotectable elements in the works at 
issue. Second, courts should be more explicit than they have generally been 
about which elements in protected works are unprotectable by copyright 
law as they go about making judgments as to nonliteral infringement. 
Third, dissection should be given more emphasis than impression when 
cases involve works having a “thin” scope of protection to ensure that 
unprotectable elements are not inadvertently protected when considering 
overall impressions. Fourth, overall impression should be given more 
emphasis in cases involving artistic and fanciful works. Fifth, while courts 
should be careful about the scope of permissible testimony to be offered by 
experts in nonliteral infringement cases, there should not be a blanket rule 
against admitting such testimony. (The matrix in the Appendix aims to 
illustrate these first five principles.) Sixth, plaintiffs in nonliteral similarity 
cases should have to prove not only that the defendants’ work is 
substantially similar to theirs, but also that the defendants appropriated a 
sufficient quantum of expression from the plaintiffs to have caused 
commercial harm. Seventh, courts should inquire whether the defendant 
had access to and copied something from the plaintiff’s work only when 
the defendant asserts he independently created the same or a similar work. 
When independent creation has been claimed, scrutiny into access and 
copying of something from the plaintiff’s work should be undertaken after 
a finding of substantial similarity in expression in order to avoid the unfair 
prejudice that may occur under the Arnstein test. 
A. Doing Dissection and Impression in Virtually All Cases 
Underlying the two-step tests in Arnstein and Krofft is an intuition that 
triers of fact in nonliteral similarity cases should engage in some dissective 
 
125 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1880) (holding bookkeeping system and forms unprotectable by copyright); 
see also Samuelson, supra note 61, at 1969–73 (discussing the implications of Baker for computer 
program copyrights). 
126 Altai, 982 F.2d at 704. 
127 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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analysis (e.g., of similarities and differences between the works at issue) as 
well as make a more holistic or overall impressionistic judgment as to 
whether the defendant’s appropriation of expression from the plaintiff’s 
work was substantial enough to subject her to liability for infringement. A 
related intuition is that dissection should come first, and impression second. 
These are sound intuitions in most cases. The only exception is when 
the protected work is highly complex and technical (e.g., internal design 
elements of computer programs) or is otherwise inaccessible to the trier of 
fact (e.g., in Arabic). In those cases, the infringement decision should be 
based solely on dissective analysis, and expert testimony may be useful in 
aiding the trier of fact to reach a sound legal conclusion. 
One difference between this Essay’s approach and the Arnstein and 
Krofft tests is the recommendation that the trier of fact should keep the 
results of his dissective analysis in mind as he proceeds to the holistic-
impression stage. And unlike Krofft and Roth, no emphasis should be 
placed on the total concept and feel of the work. 
B. Distinguishing Protectable and Unprotectable Elements 
Too often, as in Nichols, courts assume that only abstract ideas are 
beyond copyright’s scope. There are, however, many categories of 
unprotectable elements that may be embodied in copyrighted works, as the 
statute and case law have recognized. They include: 
 ideas, concepts, principles, theories, abstractions, and the like;128  
 data, information, facts, research, know-how, and the like;129  
 processes, procedures, systems, methods of operation, functions, and 
the like;130  
 rules, laws, judicial opinions, regulations, and the like;131  
 common or standard elements for works of that kind, scenes a faire, 
and the like;132  
 public domain works or features;133  
 original elements drawn from another author’s work;134  
 
128 § 102(b). 
129 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991); A.A. 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978–79 (2d Cir. 1980). 
130 § 102(b). 
131 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794–95 (5th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc). 
132 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002). 
133 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
134 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1022–23 (N.D. Cal. 
1992). 
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 works or features of works as to which there is only one or a very 
small number of ways to express an idea, so that merger of idea and 
expression is warranted;135  
 designs of useful articles depicted in copyrighted works;136 and  
 features of works that are dictated by functionality or other external 
factors (e.g., market demands).137 
Courts should be more explicit than they typically have been about the 
unprotectability of all of these elements. Obviously, not every category of 
unprotectable element will be present in every work, but when instructing 
juries or making judgments as triers of fact, courts should identify the 
relevant subset of these categories as elements that should either be filtered 
out, as in Altai, or at least kept in mind as aspects of the works that should 
not be considered in making more holistic impressionistic judgments about 
infringement. 
Protectable elements should also be given more attention. Courts 
should offer some guidance about what is original expression in relation to 
the particular kinds of works at issue. With data compilations, for instance, 
originality will generally lie in the creative selection and arrangement of 
elements. With dramatic works, novels, or motion pictures, protectable 
expression is likely to include detailed sequences of incidents and other 
plot elements, well-developed characters, and dialogue. With musical 
works, melody, lyrics, rhythm, and other specific features are protectable 
expression. With artistic and fanciful works, expression often exists in the 
overall aesthetic design. 
C. The Role of Dissection for “Thin Copyright” Works 
Many types of works have “thin” scopes of copyright protection. This 
includes “highly functional, utilitarian” works, such as computer programs, 
as to which “the Copyright Act [may] serve[] as a relatively weak barrier 
against public access to the theoretical interstices behind a program’s 
source and object codes.”138 Fact-intensive works, such as data 
compilations, have a similarly thin scope of protection because the facts 
they contain are unprotectable.139 Catalogues, instruction manuals, 
scientific and technical articles, drawings of useful articles, bookkeeping 
formbooks, contracts and other legal documents, research reports, and 
 
135 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967). 
136 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2006). 
137 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d Cir. 1992). 
138 Id. at 712. 
139 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 349 (1991) (stating that fact 
compilations have thin scope); id. at 350 (noting that “raw facts may be copied at will”). 
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derivative works of public domain works are other examples of “thin 
copyright” works.140 
In some instances (e.g., data compilations), the scope of protection 
may be so thin that an infringement finding may be warranted only where 
there is substantial identity between the works. In other instances (e.g., a 
historical work), the scope of protection may be “thicker” because the way 
that the author has expressed the facts and his research discoveries is 
protectable. 
Insofar as works have a thin scope of protection, courts should, as in 
Altai, give greater emphasis to analytic dissection, so that unprotectable 
elements do not inadvertently serve as the basis for a finding of 
infringement. Several courts have, in fact, adopted an Altai-like filtration 
test in thin copyright nonsoftware cases.141 
An overall-impression test may be inappropriate in many thin 
copyright cases, such as those involving internal structures of computer 
programs. In other cases, however, an overall impression may be 
appropriate to consider similarities in expressive aspects (e.g., lines and 
shading of drawings of useful articles); but even so, the unprotectable 
elements should be kept in mind as the impression judgment is made. 
D. Giving More Emphasis to Impression for Artistic and Fanciful Works 
Artistic and fanciful works, such as graphic designs and cartoons, tend 
to enjoy a “thicker” scope of protection from copyright law than fact-
intensive or functional works. The quantum of original expression in these 
works is often high relative to the quantum of unprotectable elements. 
Often an aesthetic design creatively weaves together individual aspects 
that, standing alone, might not be protectable. An overall-impression test is 
thus more likely to capture the expressive essence of the work than is a 
dissective analysis. 
The intuition underlying the directive in Arnstein and Krofft that the 
last stage of infringement decisions should not be based solely on 
dissection is often sound in cases involving artistic and fanciful works. It 
would be a mistake for infringement decisions to be based on whose list of 
similarities and differences is longest; this would cause the trier of fact to 
lose sight of the overall character of the works and their expressive 
elements. Holistic impression may, as Judge Hand observed, be “the 
firmer, if more naïve, ground” for making such judgments.142 But an 
 
140 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 61, at 1921 n.4 (discussing generally how § 102(b) limits 
copyright protection for functional expression); see also id. at 1961–77 (discussing case law 
interpreting § 102(b)). 
141 See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855–56 (6th Cir. 2003) (using a filtration test in a case 
involving the drawing of latch design); R. Ready Prods., Inc. v. Cantrell, 85 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675, 683 
& n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (applying a filtration test to advertising materials for automobile sales). 
142 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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overall-impression judgment should still be made with a firm recollection 
of the similarities and differences and of the protectable and unprotectable 
elements, especially when the plaintiff’s work is based on a public domain 
work. 
Artistic and fanciful works tend to lie somewhere along a broad 
spectrum of expressiveness, some being quite simple (e.g., Pufnstuf 
characters) and some very complex (e.g., Jackson Pollack’s paintings). 
Overall impression should be given more weight in making infringement 
determinations when works are on the simpler end of the spectrum. Novels, 
dramatic plays, and motion pictures are often more complex works than 
graphic art or cartoons. That is, they typically embody a wider array of 
expressive as well as unprotectable elements. In such cases, a mixture of 
dissection and overall impression should be used in making nonliteral 
infringement judgments (see Appendix). 
E. Allowing Expert Testimony When Appropriate 
Arnstein, Krofft, and Nichols expressed some skepticism about expert 
testimony in nonliteral infringement cases. Judges have questioned whether 
such testimony should be utilized when determining improper 
appropriation, and they have worried that experts might confuse the jury or 
cause trials to be too long. There may be some merit to these concerns. 
Experts probably do add to the expense and duration of a trial; they may be 
confusing to the trier of fact insofar as they employ jargon which sounds 
more erudite than is actually warranted, sometimes their evidence will be 
misleading, and litigants will be tempted to urge their experts to offer a 
conclusion on the ultimate issue in the case.143 
However, Arnstein, Krofft, and Nichols may have overreacted to the 
risks posed by expert testimony. A better approach would be to give trial 
courts discretion to allow expert testimony in appropriate cases. Sometimes 
the appropriateness of expert testimony will be apparent, as in cases 
involving software or otherwise inaccessible subject matters. But experts 
may be helpful in a wide range of cases involving more accessible works 
on issues such as the range of expressive alternatives, design features that 
have become standard in an industry, respects in which the work at issue is 
distinguishable from similar works, the degree of its originality, and 
damages issues.144 Experts may be less useful and appropriate in artistic and 
fanciful design cases insofar as triers of fact are able to judge the aesthetic 
appeal as ordinary observers as well as or better than experts.145 
When unsure about whether expert testimony would be appropriate, 
courts should ask for an offer of proof to allow them to assess the probative 
 
143 See, e.g., id. at 123. 
144 3 PATRY, supra note 8, § 9:79. 
145 See supra Part II.D. 
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value of the testimony and to refine the scope of issues the expert can 
address. However, to allow expert testimony only in independent creation 
cases, as Arnstein directed, would be a disservice to triers of fact who want 
to reach sound decisions in nonliteral infringement cases. 
F. Focusing on Substantial Similarities  
that Harm Copyright Markets and Incentives 
Substantial similarity sometimes seems to be a vacuous phrase in 
nonliteral infringement cases,146 especially when courts find infringement 
based on quantitatively small appropriations said to be qualitatively 
substantial.147 Also contributing to the lack of clarity in nonliteral similarity 
analysis is the typical judicial direction that the final judgment must be 
made based on a lay observer or listener’s impression as to the total 
concept and feel of the works in question. Substantial similarity can 
become a more meaningful concept by close study of the fact patterns of 
leading cases, with attention to the expressive choices authors have made in 
creating their works, and the cognizable commercial harm that will result 
from the defendant’s appropriation of this expression from the plaintiff’s 
work. 
Courts should direct the trier of fact to consider, first, who is the 
intended audience(s) for the works at issue; second, what level of 
sophistication or expertise should that audience be understood to have; and 
third, while keeping in mind that audience and its relative sophistication, 
whether the defendant appropriated a substantial enough quantum of 
expression from the plaintiff’s work as to cause commercial harm to the 
plaintiff’s actual or reasonably foreseeable markets or to her incentives to 
engage in creative work. Commercial harm has not to date been explicitly 
required as an essential element for proving nonliteral infringement, but it 
would be a reasonable development in U.S. copyright law. 
Presuming harm to copyright markets may be appropriate when 
defendants are selling exact or near-exact copies of the whole or 
 
146 There is an extensive literature in cognitive science about what similarity means and how it 
should be measured. There are at least four models for what that term means. One focuses on feature-
based similarities. “This model matches the features or properties of the two things being compared and 
computes a similarity measure according to three sets of features: those they share, those the first has 
that the second lacks, and those that the second has that the first lacks.” ROBERT J. GLUSHKO ET AL., 
THE DISCIPLINE OF ORGANIZING 253 (Robert J. Glushko ed., 2013). Yet because of difficulties in 
identifying the properties on which similarities should be judged, some cognitive scientists consider the 
concept of similarity to be “meaningless.” Id. at 270 n.360. And this was without reading the copyright 
nonliteral infringement cases. 
147 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a four-second sample from a sound recording is not de minimis); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
majority found that a news article reproducing 300 words from a 200,000 word manuscript was 
infringing). 
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quantitatively substantial parts of the plaintiff’s work in the same or in 
overlapping marketplace(s).148 But a presumption of harm is not justifiable 
when defendants have engaged in some degree of transformativeness in 
their uses of the plaintiffs’ works, as is typical in nonliteral infringement 
cases.149 
If a defendant raises a fair use defense in a nonliteral infringement 
case,150 it will be necessary to consider not only whether the amount taken 
was reasonable in light of the defendant’s purpose, but also whether that 
appropriation has harmed “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets” that copyright owners are entitled to control.151 If a defendant 
instead argues that it took only ideas or other unprotectable elements from 
the plaintiff’s work or that similarities between the works are too abstract 
to be actionable, as in Krofft, Roth, and Nichols, it is sensible to consider 
harm to markets (or lack thereof) in other types of nonliteral similarity 
cases. 
A plethora of fair use cases demonstrate that appropriations of 
expression from copyrighted works do not always cause actionable harm.152 
Cases such as Krofft, however, demonstrate that nonliteral copying can 
sometimes cause provable harm to the plaintiff’s markets. Krofft, after all, 
was unable to grant new or extend old licenses to Pufnstuf characters 
because of McDonald’s vigorous merchandising campaign.153 
Although some commentators in the past have questioned whether 
harm should be a factor in copyright infringement determinations,154 
 
148 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (noting that courts can 
presume harm as to commercially distributed, verbatim copies). This presumption may generally be 
unnecessary, however, as harm will often be easy to prove when a defendant is distributing exact or 
near-exact copies. 
149 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring plaintiffs to 
prove irreparable harm, among other things, to be entitled to injunctive relief); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
583–84 (rejecting a presumption of harm in transformative use cases); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 
82–83 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating a preliminary injunction because there was no showing of irreparable 
harm as eBay requires in a nonliteral similarity case). 
150 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”). 
151 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (holding that copyright owners are not entitled to control all markets for transformative uses of 
their works). 
152 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) 
(discussing the policy clusters in which fair use cases tend to fall). 
153 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161–62 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
154 See, e.g., David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 421, 422 (1983) (characterizing the “notion of economic ‘harm’ as a prerequisite for copyright 
protection [a]s mischievous”); Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions 
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numerous contemporary commentators have made cogent arguments in 
favor of harm as a factor in nonliteral infringement cases.155 Professor 
Sprigman, for instance, has argued for a per se rule against literal copying 
that competes in the same market as the plaintiff’s work, but for a rule-of-
reason approach to nonliteral copying under which a finding of 
infringement would depend on proof of harm to the plaintiff’s markets or 
his incentives to create.156 
G. Avoiding Prejudice in Independent Creation Cases 
To avoid the unfair prejudice to defendants that the Arnstein test may 
inadvertently pose,157 triers of fact should consider evidence of access and 
similarities in unprotectable elements as relevant to infringement only 
when defendants assert that they independently created a similar work. 
Such claims seem to be relatively rare.158 If a defendant does raise an 
independent creation defense, the trier of fact should consider, first, 
whether there is enough substantial similarity in the expression of the 
works so that, if copied from the plaintiff’s work, it would justify a finding 
of infringement, and then go on to determine whether these expressive 
similarities are attributable to independent creation by two different authors 
or whether the defendant is lying about independent creation or has 
engaged in unconscious copying. Circumstantial evidence of access and of 
similarities unlikely to be the result of independent creation would then be 
relevant to test this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The easiest way to avoid the “viscid quandary” that nonliteral 
infringement cases present would be to return to a rule that only exact or 
near-exact copies (i.e., slavish imitations) are infringements. While that 
approach has some normative appeal because it would make copyright law 
more predictable and provide follow-on creators with greater freedom to 
draw upon today’s copyright-saturated cultural landscape, the weight of 
modern precedents and the statutory derivative-work right make this 
unlikely. 
 
for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1209–14 (2010) (discussing the cons as well as the pros of 
commercial harm as an element of infringement). 
155 See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT 
33–59, 161–99 (2012); Wendy J. Gordon, Harmless Use: Gleaning from Fields of Copyrighted Works, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2411, 2435 (2009). 
156 Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
317, 334–40 (2009). 
157 See supra Part I.A 
158 Arnstein is the only case discussed in this Essay to have involved an independent creation 
defense. 
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There are, moreover, some normative reasons why copyright should 
extend to more than exact or near-exact copies.159 The principal reason is 
that society is likely to get increased and more diverse contributions to 
science (broadly construed) and to culture if follow-on creators are induced 
to express themselves differently than previous authors. Secondarily, a 
nonliteral infringement rule discourages the making of close imitations by 
those seeking to evade liability through modest variations or addition of 
extra detail. A nonliteral infringement rule also protects the legitimate 
interests of authors against unfair appropriations of the commercial value 
of the expressive components of their works. 
The main objective of this Essay has been to explain why a one-size-
fits-all approach to judging nonliteral infringement, such as Krofft and 
Nichols attempted, is unworkable. Given the very considerable diversity 
among types of copyrighted works and the wide range of expressiveness 
such works embody, tests for nonliteral infringement need to be tailored to 
recognize this. In addition, courts should consider the interests of 
subsequent generations of creators as well as those of current generation 
creators when judging nonliteral infringement cases to ensure that 
copyright fulfills its constitutional purpose of promoting the ongoing 
progress of knowledge creation and dissemination. Only the appropriation 
of a substantial quantum of expression from a plaintiff’s work that will 
cause harm to the copyright owner’s markets and incentives to create 
should result in liability. Drawing the line between infringement and fair 
following will never be easy, but it is not “inevitably ad hoc,” as Judge 
Hand once cleverly opined. Adopting the proposals recommended in this 
Essay will hopefully lead to more coherence and consistency in this viscid 
part of U.S. copyright law. 
  
 
159 Some commentators have suggested that nonliteral infringements be considered as implicating 
the derivative-work right, with the reproduction right being reserved for exact or near-exact copying 
cases. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 683, 739 (2012). One commentator has made a cogent argument for granting monetary, but not 
injunctive, relief in nonliteral similarity cases. See Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: 
Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
39, 53 (1998). 
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APPENDIX 
Matrix for Infringement Analysis in Different Types of Cases (with Examples) 
 
 Artistic/Fanciful Works Functional/Factual Works 
Simple 
Works 
More emphasis on overall holistic 
impression 
More emphasis on dissection to 
filter out unprotectable elements 
Whole may be greater than sum of 
parts 
Thin scope of protection because of 
unprotectables 
Less emphasis on dissection 
(unless variant on public domain 
work) 
May be inappropriate to use overall 
holistic impression 
Experts unlikely to be needed Expert testimony may be needed 
Ex.: Krofft v. McDonald’s Ex.: Lotus v. Borland 
Complex 
Works 
Mixture of dissection and overall 
impression needed  
Heavily dissective analysis is 
generally appropriate to filter out 
unprotectable elements; danger that 
overall impression may lead to 
mistaken infringement ruling  
Final judgment based mostly on 
overall holistic impression, but 
keeping unprotectable elements in 
mind 
Important to ensure that 
unprotectable elements are filtered 
out before assessing similarities in 
expression 
Worry that too much dissection 
will miss forest for the trees  
Wary of overall impression 
Need for care in use of experts  Expert testimony may be needed  
Ex.: Nichols v. Universal Ex.: Computer Associates v. Altai 
 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1850 
 
